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Abstract 
Kerberos-type authentication protocols have more 
to offer when they are founded upon public key 
cryptosystems. In the current paper we argue and 
illustrate this point by way of presenting a proto-
col that implements Kerberos using a recent and 
promising public key cryptosystem, which is se-
cure against the adaptatively chosen ciphertext at-
tacks. The flexibility of the solution is highlighted 
by extending the protocol to allow the use of one 
ticket for multiple services. The issue of hierarchi-
cal inter-realm authentication is also considered by 
way of two protocols based on the notion of local-
ized and globalized keys respectively. These pro-
tocols represents a step towards a family of solu-
tions based on the combination of the advantages 
of private key and public key cryptography. 
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1 Introduction 
Authentication represents an important secu-
rity functionality in computer networks and dis-
tributed systems. Informally, authentication 
refers to the ability of the receiver of a message 
to verify that the message truly came from the al-
leged sender. Authentication, which is often cou-
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pled with secrecy, is usually achieved by way of 
cryptographic functions. Two philosophies under-
current in modern cryptology are private (shared 
or symmetric) key cryptography and public (asym-
metric) key cryptography. 
In private key cryptosystems the sender and 
the receiver share the one same key used to en-
cipher and decipher the message text. Decipher-
ability of a piece of ciphertext implies the authen-
ticity of the text. In public key cryptosystems the 
secret key known only to the sender is related to 
a public key available to the sender and any other 
party. Since the secret key and public key are re-
lated, any plaintext enciphered using one key can 
only be deciphered using the other key. Extract-
ing the secret key from the corresponding public 
key is deemed to be computationally infeasible. 
From these two fundamental types of cryp-
tosystems a range of different functionalities can 
be established by way of building protocols that 
embody one or the other (or both) of these types 
of cryptosystems [1]. Due to the complexity and 
cost of the task of ensuring a correct and tamper-
free implementations [2] of such protocols as an 
integrated part of the architecture (eg. ISO /OSI, 
Internet) a more common approach has been to 
place them in the upper layers of such architec-
tures. 
One authentication system that has received 
considerable attention in the recent past is the 
Kerberos authentication service [3, 4, 5], which 
is a component within the Project Athena at 
MIT [6]. Kerberos adopts the private (shared) key 
approach, and is a trusted third-party authenti-
cation service developed from the authentication 
model of [7]. The Kerberos authentication service 
provides a trusted intermediary between a User or 
Client that requires services from a Server. It au-
thenticates the User or Client by way of a shared 
private key, and it provides a way for the Server 
to authenticate the User or Client when it request 
the services of the Server. 
Due to the use of private key cryptography, 
the Kerberos authentication service requires a key 
to be shared between the User or Client and the 
trusted authorities in the system, namely the Key 
Distribution Center (KDC) and the Ticket Grant-
ing Server (TGS) [5]. This, however, requires a 
great amount of trust to be placed on the im ple-
mentation of the trusted authorities, since their 
compromise results in possible masquerade by the 
attacker of the User or Client whose private key 
are stored with these trusted authorities. 
With this in mind, in this paper we investi-
gate an alternative approach based on the use of a 
public key cryptosystem, following the footsteps of 
Kerberos and offering new functionalities such the 
use of multiple-service tickets. A public key ap-
proach gains the advantage of requiring less trust 
in the implementation of the trusted authorities. 
This advantage is derived from the nature of pub-
lic key cryptosystems which only requires the User 
or Client to share the publicly-known key with the 
trusted authorities. Hence, the compromise of the 
trusted authorities does not lead to the possible 
masquerade of the User or Client. 
Another advantage of this approach is the 
ability of the Clients to use their public keys to 
perform one-to-one secure communications with 
other Clients. This ability is not immediately 
present in Kerberos since any two Clients must 
first establish a common key via a key-exchange 
protocol before they can communicate securely. 
Finally, contrary to the common public key 
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approaches of using the de facto standard RSA 
cryptosystem [8], we employ the recent and at-
tractive public key cryptosystem of [9] which offers 
some inherent advantages over RSA. The cryp-
tosystem of [9] has been shown to be secure against 
the strongest type of attacks, namely the adap-
tatively chosen ciphertext attacks. In addition, 
the cryptosystem allows Clients and other partic-
ipants to share common parameters in a secure 
fashion, leading to interesting key compositions. 
Such key compositions are virtually impossible to 
be achieved using the RSA cryptosystem since the 
parameters related to the generation of a secret-
public key pair must be maintained secret by the 
owner of the key pair. 
In the next section (Section 2) we briefly sum-
marize the Kerberos authentication service (ver-
sion 5) as described in [5]. We assume the readers 
are familiar with the basic constructs and mech-
anisms of Kerberos, and we direct them to [3, 5] 
for more details on its implementation. In Sec-
tion 3 we present our approach using the public 
key cryptosystem of [9]. This is continued in Sec-
tion 4 by an investigation into the use tickets for 
multiple services. The algorithms that implement 
our approach are then given in Section 5. As an 
afterthought, the flexibility of our approach is fur-
ther illustrated in Section 6 by inter-realm authen-
tication in a hierarchically organized realms or do-
mains, each managed by a TGS. Section 7 presents 
a brief discussion and comparison between our ap-
proach and Kerberos, whilst Section 8 briefly dis-
cusses the security level achieved by our solution. 
The paper is finally closed in Section 9 by some 
concluding remarks. 
2 Kerberos authentication ser-. VIce 
In the Kerberos authentication system [3, 5] the 
entities that interact with the authentication ser-
vice are called principals. The term can be used 
for Users, Clients or Servers. Commonly, a user 
directs a Client (eg. a program) on a machine to 
request a service provided by a Server on a remote 
machine. The Server itself is usually a process 
on the remote machine, and different services are 
usually taken to be available on differing remote 
machines. Kerberos employs two types of creden-
tials to achieve authentications, namely the tickets 
of the form 
{s, c, addr, timestamp, lifetime, Ks,e} 
and the authenticators of the form 
{c, addr, timestamp} 
which is enciphered using a key common to the is-
suer and the recipient. Here the ticket consists 
of the Server and Client identities, followed by 
the Client's network address, a unique timestamp, 
the lifetime of the ticket and finally by the com-
mon key to be shared between the Server and the 
Client [3]. In this example, the ticket contains 
the key Ks,e shared between the Client c and the 
Server s. The Server is trusted to generate such 
shared keys and when the ticket is to be given to 
a Client c then it must be enciphered using the 
Client's key Ke. 
In brief, the interactions within the authen-
tication service consists of the Client requesting 
the Key Distribution Center (KDC) for a ticket-
granting ticket to be submitted by the Client to 
the Ticket Granting Server (TGS). The TGS then 
issues the Client with a service ticket which has a 
shorter lifetime compared to the ticket-granting 
ticket. The service ticket is then used by the 
Client to request the services of the Server which 
is mentioned in the ticket. These two stages are 
also referred to as the credential-initialization and 
client-server authentication protocols respectively 
in [10]. 
The actions of the Kerberos authentication 
service following the description of [5] is given in 
the following (Figure 1). 
1. Client -+ KDC: c, tgs 
2. KDC -+ Client: {Ke,tgs}Kc' {Te,tgs}Ktgs 
3. Client -+ TGS: {Ae} Kc,tgs' {Te,tgs} Ktgs ' S 
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Figure 1: Obtaining a service ticket (after [5]) 
4. TGS -+ Client: {Ke,s}Kc,tgs' {Te,S}Ks 
5. Client -+ Server: {Ae}Kc,s' {Te,s}Ks 
6. Server -+ Client: {timestamp + l}Kc,s 
In step 1 the Client c requests the Key Dis-
tribution Center (KDC) for an initial ticket and 
credentials to be presented to the Ticket Granting 
Server (TGS). 
In step 2 the KDC generates a session key 
K t that will be shared between the Client and e, gs 
the TGS. A copy ofthis key is enciphered using the 
Client's key Ke to guarantee that the Client can 
obtain it securely. The ticket-granting ticket Te,tgs 
to be presented to the TGS by the Client already 
contains a copy of the session key Ke,tgs' Hence, 
both the Client and the TGS can later communi-
cate securely using this session key shared between 
them. Note that the ticket is enciphered using the 
TGS's private key K tgs known only to the KDC 
and the TGS. 
In step 3 the Client then creates an authenti-
cator Ae to be read only by the TGS (hence enci-
phered using Ke,tgs) and presents it to the TG~ to-
gether with the ticket {Te,tgs}Ktgs which the Client 
obtained from the KDC. 
On receiving the authenticator and ticket-
granting ticket from the Client, the TGS deci-
phers and authenticates the ticket (step 4). The 
TGS then generates another session key Ke,s to 
be shared between the Client c and the Server s. 
The TGS also creates a service ticket destined for 
the Server. This ticket Te,s contains a copy of the 
new session key, and its lifetime is shorter than 
the lifetime of the initial ticket Te,tgs' The TGS 
knows the private key of every Server s, and ticket 
is made exclusively for the eyes of the Server by 
enciphering it using Ks. A copy of the session 
key Ke,s (hidden by enciphering it using Ke,tgs) 
accompanies the ticket to the Client. 
In step 5, the Client enciphers the authenti-
cator Ae using the session key Ke,s which it will 
share with the Server s. This is then sent to the 
Server s together with the ticket obtained from the 
TGS. The Client may request the Server to prove 
its identity which can be achieved by the Server 
incrementing the timestamp value by one, and en-
ciphering the result using the session key shared 
between the Server and the Client (step 6). 
3 Public key approach 
In this section we propose an approach based on 
public key cryptography. Our approach is founded 
on the public key cryptosystem of [9], and some of 
its constructs that are necessary for the current 
discussion will be presented in the following. The 
algorithms that implement the cryptosystem are 
deferred until Section 5 in order to simplify dis-
cussion. 
In the public key cryptosystem of [9] a secret 
key is is chosen randomly and uniformly from the 
integers in [l,p - 1], where the prime p is public 
and is used to generate the multiplicative group 
GF(p)* of the finite field GF(p). The generator 
of this multiplicative group is denoted as 9 and it 
is a publicly known value. This usage of 9 and p 
is inspired by notable works of [11] and [12]. The 
corresponding public key is then produced by us-
ing the secret key as the exponent of 9 modulo 
p. In the remainder of this paper all exponentia-
tions are assumed to be done over the underlying 
groups. 
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For the current usage of the cryptosystem, as-
sume that the secret and public key pairs of the 
principals are as follows. The KDC has the pair 
(Xkde,Ykde == gXkdc ), the Client has (xe,Ye == gXc), 
the TGS has (Xtgs , ytgs == gXtgs), while the Server 
has (Xs, Ys == gXs). The keys Ykde, Ye, ytgs and Ys 
are known to the public as in other systems based 
on public key cryptography. 
Each session secret and public key pair is de-
noted by (k, K == gk), and their subscripts indi-
cates which principals employ the key pair. Hence, 
the pair (ke,tgs, Ke,tgs) is used for interactions be-
tween the Client and the TGS. In our case the 
tickets to be employed do not contain any keys, 
hence their form are: 
{s, c, addr, timestamp, lifetime} 
3.1 Getting an initial ticket 
1. Client -+ KDC: c, tgs 
2. KDC -+ Client: Ke,tgs, Ce,tgs 
The KDC first generates the session key pair 
(ke,tgs, K e,tgs) to be used between the Client 
and the TGS. 
The cryptogram Ce,tgs is the ticket-granting 
ticket Te,tgs being enciphered as: 
where 
C = {T } e,tgs - e,tgs Tc,tgs 
r = (y ~ )Xkdc+kc,tgs e,tgs - e .1 tgs 
3. Client -+ TGS: Ae,tgs, Ke,tgs, Ce,tgs, S 
(1) 
On receiving the enciphered ticket Ce,tgs to-
gether with its accompanying session public 
key Ke,tgs the Client computes a Authentica-
tor Ae,tgs: 
The authenticator, the received session public 
key and enciphered ticket-granting ticket, and 
the identity of the destination Server s are 
then delivered to the TGS. 
The TGS employs the session public key 
Kc,tgs to compute its Decryptor Dtgs,c as: 
This is then used to recreate the key r c,tgs that 
was used by the KDC to encipher the ticket: 
r~,t9S == Ac,tgs Dtgs,c 
The resulting key r~,t9S is then used to recover 
the ticket Tc,tgs. 
3.2 Getting a service ticket 
In order to obtain the services of the Server the 
Client must obtain a service ticket from the TGS 
to be presented to the Server. We continue the 
procedure in the following steps. 
4. TGS ~ Client: Kc,s, Cc,s 
In order to encipher the service ticket Tc,s 
the TGS must generate the session key pair 
(kc,s, Kc,s) which is used as follows: 
where 
r = (y y. )Xtgs+kc.s C,s - c s 
resulting in the cryptogram Cc,s. 
The cryptogram Cc,s and the session public 
key Kc,s are then delivered to the Client. 
5. Client ~ Server: Ac s, Kc s, Cc s , , , 
As when dealing with the TGS, the Client 
must compute the authenticator Ac,s indicat-
ing its desire to use the service provided by 
the Server: 
This authenticator, the received session pub-
lic key and enciphered service ticket are then 
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presented to the Server whenever the Client 
requires the service. 
On first being presented with the (enciphered) 
service ticket, the Server must compute its 
corresponding decrypt or 
Ds,c == (ytgs Kc,s)xS 
The Server is then able to recreate the session 
key r C,s as: 
r'C s == Ac s D s c , " 
to be used to obtain {Tc,sllkc,s}. 
6. Server ~ Client: {timestamp + l}r s.c 
If required, the Server may respond to the 
Client's request of proving the Server's iden-
tity. This can be done by the Server reusing 
the key kc,s that was enciphered together with 
the service ticket Tc,s. The key is reused to 
create rs,c as: 
to encipher {timestamp + 1}. 
The Client can recreate the key rs,c as: 
which is then used to recover and check 
{timestamp + 1}. 
4 Multiple-Service ticket 
It would be convenient if a Client could use one 
service-ticket to access several distinct services of-
fered by various Servers. We can do this as will be 
shown here. 
First, the TGS must be notified by the Client 
about the q services S1, S2, •.• ,Sq that the Client 
wishes to access. We can repeat the last two steps 
(ie. steps 4 and 5) as follows: 
M3. Client ~ TGS: Ac,tgs, Kc,tgs, Cc,tgs, m 
( S1, S2, ••• , Sq) 
M4. TGS Client: 
The TGS prepares the service ticket Te,m, 
generates the key pair (ke,m, Ke,m) and en-
ciphers the ticket into Ce,m: 
Ce,m == {Te,mllke,m}rc,m 
where 
Te m = (Ye Y. Y. ... y. )Xtgs+kc,m 
,- 81 82 8q 
The TGS must also computer q number of 
selectors Re,S1' Re,S2' ••• ,Re,sq which will be 
used by the Client to choose among the q 
specified Servers S1, S2, ••• , Sq. These selec-
tors are computed as: 
(Y. Y. ... y. )Xtgs+kc,m 82 83 Sq 
(Y. y. ... 1': )Xtgs+kc,m 81 83 8q 
(Y. Y. ... y. )Xtgs+kc,m 81 S2 8 q -l 
The cryptogram Ce,m, the session public key 
K e,m and the selectors are then delivered to 
the client. 
As in the single-service case, the Client must 
compute its authenticator to be delivered to 
the Server. Thus, 
However, in this multi-service case, the Client 
must select the Server from which it requires 
service. Assuming that the Client requires 
service from Server Sv (1 ~ v ~ q), then the 
Client must employ the selector Re,8v' 
This authenticator Ae,m, the received session 
public key Ke,m, the enciphered service ticket 
C e,m and the selector Re,8v must then be pre-
sen ted to the Server Sv' 
On first being presented with the (enciphered) 
service ticket, the Server Sv must compute its 
corresponding decrypt or 
Dm,e == (Ytg8 Ke,m)xSv 
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The Server is then able to recreate the session 
key Te 8 as , 
Te' m == Ae m Dm e Re 8 , , , , tI 
to be used to decipher the service ticket Ce m' , 
5 Algorithms 
As described briefly in Section 3, our approach is 
based on the public key cryptosystem of [9]. In 
this section we provide further notations for the 
cryptosystem and present the algorithm for the 
encipherment and decipherment of tickets based 
on a modified version of the original cryptosystem 
of [9]. The algorithms expresses only the encipher-
ment (decipherment) of the plaintext (ciphertext) 
tickets, and do not incorporate the steps taken by 
the KDC, Client, TGS and the Server. Hence, the 
reader is encouraged to read them in conjunction 
with the steps provided in Sections 3.2 and 3.1. 
5.1 Notation 
The following notation is taken directly from [9]. 
The cryptosystem of [9] employs a n-bit prime p 
(public) and a generator 9 (public) of the multi-
plicative group G F(p)* of the finite field G F(p). 
Here n is a security parameter which is greater 
that 512 bits, while the prime p must be chosen 
such that p - 1 has a large prime factor. Concate-
nation of string are denoted using the "II" symbol 
and the bit-wise XOR operations of two strings is 
symbolized using "EB". The notation W[i ... j] (i ~ j) 
is used to indicate the substring obtained by tak-
ing the bits of string W from the i-th bit (Wi) to 
the j-th bit (Wj). 
The action of choosing an element x randomly 
and uniformly from set S is denoted by XERS. Gis 
a cryptographically strong pseudo-random string 
generator based on the difficulty of computing dis-
crete logarithms in finite fields [9]. G stretches 
an n-bit input string into an output string whose 
length can be an arbitrary polynomial in n. This 
generator produces O(log n) bits output at each 
exponentiation. All messages to be encrypted are 
chosen from the set ~P(n), where pen) is an ar-
bitrary polynomial with P( n) 2: n and where 
padding can be used for messages of length less 
than n bits. The polynomial i = i( n) specifies 
the length of tags. The function h is a one-way 
hash function compressing input strings into i-bit 
output strings. In the remainder of this paper all 
exponentiations are assumed to be done over the 
underlying groups. The reader is directed to [9] 
for a comprehensive discussion on the constructs 
of the family of cryptosystems. 
5.2 Getting initial and service tickets 
In the process of getting an initial ticket the 
Clients asks the KDC to prepare the ticket to be 
submitted by the Client to the TGS. The KDC 
first performs ke,tgsER[1,p-1] followed by the cal-
culation Ke,tgs == gkc,tgs. The KDC then enciphers 
the ticket Te,tgs using the key re,tgs by invoking 
Encipher (Algorithm 1) with the input parameters 
(p, g, r e,tgs, Te,tgs) resulting in the output Ce,tgs. 
Algorithm 1 Encipher(p,g, r, T) 
1. z = G(r)[l ... (P(n)H(n))]. 
2. t = h(T tB r). 
3. m = (Tilt). 
4. G = z tB m. 
5. output (G). 
end 
The KDC then sends the resulting ciphertext 
Ge,tgs and the session public key Ke,tgs to the 
Client who proceeds to compute Ae,tgs. These 
values are then submitted by the Client to the 
TGS who tries to decipher Ce,tgs. This is done 
by the TGS first computing Dtgs,e and using 
it and the received values as input to Deci-
pher (Algorithm 2). That is, the TGS inputs 
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(p, g, Ae,tgs, Ke,tgs, Ge,tgs, Dtgs,e) and receives the 
output Te,tgs. 
Algorithm 2 Decipher(p,g, A, K, G, D) 
end 
1. r' = AD. 
2. z' = G( r')[l ... (P(n)+l(n))]. 
3. m=z'tBG. 
4. T' = m[l ... P(n)]. 
5. t' = m[(P(n)-!;1) ... (P(n)H(n))]. 
6. if h(T' tB r') '= t' then 
output (T') 
else 
output (0). 
The same procedure is followed by the TGS 
in enciphering the ticket to be submitted by the 
Client to the Server. The minor difference in this 
case is that the TGS appends a response key ke,s 
(ie. the secret half of the session key) to the ticket 
Te,s. This addition does not affect the algorithms 
and their security in any way. Hence, the TGS in-
vokes Encipher (Algorithm 1) with the input pa-
rameters (p, g, re,s, (Te,sllke,s» resulting in the out-
put Gc,s. The Server deciphers Ge,s into (Te,sllke,s) 
using Decipher (Algorithm 2) with input values 
(p,g, Ae,s, Ke,s, Ge,s, Ds,e). 
6 Hierarchical inter-realm au-
thentication 
The integration of security into distributed sys-
tems has introduced the need to manage the in-
formation pertaining to the security functions in 
the distributed system. The most common and 
important need is that of providing a method to 
manage cryptographic keys of the components in 
the distributed system. One approach that may 
be adopted is that of organizing the components 
into a hierarchy consisting of a number of domains 
or realms, each being managed by an independent 
trusted authority (eg. TGS). This approach has 
the advantage of the localized distribution of new 
keys, hence reducing the replication of keys across 
the entire distributed system. 
Within the context of our discussion a domain 
or realm can consist of Clients, Servers, a local 
managing TGS and of other TGSs that manage 
their own realms. In this manner, the compo-
nents are organized into a hierarchy based on the 
TGSs, with each TGS managing a certain num-
ber of Clients, Servers and other TGSs. A Client 
within a realm may request service from a Server 
in the same domain in the manner previously dis-
cussed. However, it is also natural for a Client to 
request service from a "foreign" Server which is 
located in a different realm on another part of the 
hierarchy. In this section we address inter-realm 
authentication together with some accompanying 
issues. Our approach is general enough to be ap-
plicable to a number of areas, one being the X.500 
Directory Services [13]. 
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Figure 2: A hierarchy of TGSs 
In our usage, a hierarchy is assumed to be a 
directed acyclic graph and each node in the hierar-
chy is assumed to have only one parent node. An 
example of such a hierarchy that will be used in the 
following discussions is given in Figure 2. In Fig-
ure 2 the Client is located in the domain or realm 
under the jurisdiction of the TGS A. The Client 
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requires the service provided by a Server which is 
located within the realm of TGS C. In this case 
the TGS A must enroll the aid of its parent TGS 
B to forward the Client's request to TGS node C. 
Two general arrangements of the keys of the nodes 
in the hierarchy will be considered in the follow-
ing. Note that the terms "TGS" and "node" will 
be used interchangeably to simplify discussion. In 
our example, we assume that the TGSs A, Band 
C have the key pairs (Xtgsa , Ytgsa), (Xtgsb, Ytgsb) 
and (Xtgsc , Ytgsc) respectively. 
6.1 Localized keys 
One possible arrangement of keys in the hierarchy 
is based on their maintenance on a per realm basis. 
That is, in this arrangement a TGS node holds 
the public key of only its parent node and all its 
children nodes. This arrangement is similar to the 
arrangement of directories in [14]. Using Figure 2 
as an example, TGS node B has the public key of 
its parent and of TGS nodes A and C. However, 
B does not have the public keys of the descendants 
of TGS nodes A and C. In this situation the TGS 
node A must refer the Client to node A's parent, 
namely node B. The node B, not knowing the 
public key of the Server must then refer the Client 
to B's child node C. Since node C is the trusted 
authority of the realm in which the Server resides, 
node C knows the public key of the Server and 
thus can forward the Client's request to the Server. 
These steps are shown in the following (Figure 3). 
Note that in essence, the Client must interact with 
every TGS node between its own TGS node (A) 
and the common ancestor node (B), and between 
the common ancestor node and the destination's 
TGS node (C). The deeper the Client is located in 
the hierarchy from the common ancestor, the more 
interactions it has to perform in order to reach the 
destination. 
1. Client --t KDC: c, tgsa 
2. KDC --t Client: Kc,tgsa, Cc,tgsa 
3. Client --t TGS A: Ac,tgsa, Kc,tgsa, Cc,tgsa, S 
4. TGS A --t Client: Kc,tgsb, Cc,tgsb 
5. Client -+ TGS B: Ac,tgsb, Kc,tgsb, Gc,tgsb, s 
6. TGS B -+ Client: Kc,tgsc, Gc,tgsc 
7. Client -+ TGS G: Ac,tgsc, Kc,tgsc, Gc,tgsc, S 
8. TGS G -+ Client: Kc,s, Gc,s 
9. Client -+ Server: Ac,s, Kc,s, Gc,s 
10. Server -+ Client: {timestamp + l}r 
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Figure 3: Authentication with localized keys 
6.2 Globalized keys 
Another possible arrangement of keys in the hi-
erarchy is a more globalized one, in which a node 
knows not only the public key of all its descendant 
nodes, but also the public key of all its ancestor 
nodes (bearing in mind that a node only has one 
parent). Here a node does not have the public keys 
of any of its sibling nodes nor that of their descen-
dants. Although such a configuration is costly in 
terms of the number of messages to be delivered 
when a node generates a new public key, the gains 
occur during the interaction with nodes located in 
other realms. Note that in our approach the public 
keys are not distributed in a fully globalized man-
ner. That is, since a node does not have the public 
keys of its siblings, it must request the aid of its 
parent when dealing with such siblings. However, 
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the steps used in our approach can be modified in 
a straight-forward manner to suit cases in which 
a node has a copy of the public key of every other 
node in the hierarchy. 
Returning to our scenario where a Client re-
quires the services offered by a foreign Server, the 
TGS in the Client's realm has more flexibility in 
issuing the enciphered ticket. Hence, with a TGS 
node knowing the public keys of all its ancestors, 
the node can find a common ancestor between it-
self and the TGS who manages the realm in which 
the Server resides. Looking back at Figure 2, the 
TGS node A (managing the Client's realm) and 
the TGS node G (managing the Server's realm) 
have a common ancestor (parent) in the TGS node 
B. 
In this case, the TGS node A must prepare the 
enciphered ticket to be decipherable by the com-
mon ancestor (node B). This common ancestor 
node B must then locate the desired Server and 
re-encipher the ticket in such a way that it is deci-
pherable by the Server with the necessary approval 
of the TGS within the Server's realm. That is, the 
ticket must be decipherable by the Server with the 
approval of the TGS node G in the form of node 
G sending a decrypt or for the ticket to the Server. 
Note that only TGS A and G are involved with 
the common ancestor B, event hough both TGSs 
A and G may have many other ancestors between 
them and TGS B respectively. Hence, in such a 
globalized key approach only a maximum of three 
TGSs (A, B and G) are invoked independent of 
the depth of the two TGS nodes (A and G) from 
their common ancestor (B). This scenario is ex-
pressed in the following steps (Figure 4). 
1. Client -+ KDC: c,tgsa 
2. KDC -+ Client: Kc,tgsa, Gc,tgsa 
3. Client -+ TGS A: Ac,tgsa, Kc,tgsa, Gc,tgsa, S 
4. TGS A -+ TGS B: Kc,tgsb, Gc,tgsb 
Here 
Gc,tgsb == {Tc,tgsb}r t b 
C, g8 
where 
T b 
= (y v b)Xtgsa+kc,tgSb c,tgs - c .I tg8 
5. TGS A ~ Client: Kc,tgsb 
6. Client ~ TGS B: Ac,tgsa 
where 
7. TGS B ~ TGS C: Kc,tgscs, Cc,tgscs 
The TGS B computes 
D - (V K )X1gSb tgsb,tgsa = ~ tgsa c,tgsb 
and recreates the key 
r~,tgsb == Ac,tgsa Dtgsb,tgsa 
in order to decipher Cc,tgsb into Tc,tgsb. 
TGS B then renames the ticket into Tc,tgscs 
and enciphers it as 
Cc,tgscs == {Tc,tgscsllkc,tgscs} rc,lgscs 
where 
r = (y V Y. )Xlgsb+kc,lgscS c,tgscs - c ~ tgsc s 
8. TGS B ~ Client: Kc,tgscs 
9. TGS C ~ Server: Kc,tgscs, Cc,tgscs, Dtgsc,tgsb 
where 
D - (l;,r K )xlgSC tgsc,tgsb = ~ tgsb c,tgscs 
10. Client ~ Server: Ac,tgsb 
where 
The Server then computes 
and recreates the key 
r~,t9SCS == Ac,tgsb Dtgsc,tgsb D s,tgsb 
in order to decipher Cc,tgscs into 
{Tc,tgscsllkc,tgscs} 
11. Server ~ Client: {timestamp + 1}r 
s,c 
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Figure 4: Authentication with globalized keys 
7 Discussion 
One fundamental difference between our approach 
and that of Kerberos [3, 5] lies in the underlying 
usage of the cryptosystem. In Kerberos and other 
authentication systems based on private (shared) 
key cryptography, the Clients must share a com-
mon key with the trusted authority, such as the 
KDC or the TGS. This necessitates a high level of 
security in the implementation of the trusted au-
thority since their compromise immediately leads 
to the compromise of the Client's key or of the keys 
belonging to other trusted authorities. This fur-
ther leads to the possible masquerade of the Client 
and/or the trusted authorities by the attacker [10]. 
In contrast, in our approach less trust is re-
quired of the authority since the compromise of 
such an authority (ie. KDC and/or TGS) only re-
veals to the attacker the public keys of the Clients. 
Hence, the attacker cannot masquerade as the 
Client nor as a trusted authority. 
With specific reference to Kerberos, our ap-
proach also differs in the way the Client's authen-
ticators are used. In [3, 5] the authenticator is 
used to convince the trusted authority (ie. TGS 
or Server) that the Client holds the same copy of 
the session key being shared between them. The 
authenticator here consists of a piece of text con-
taining the timestamp from the ticket. In our 
approach the process is less explicit in the sense 
that the authenticator (decryptor or selector) is 
a parameter that is required by the trusted au-
thority to decipher the ticket. If an attacker re-
moves, modifies or substitutes the authenticator, 
the trusted authority (ie. TGS and Server) will 
not be able to decipher the ticket, leading it to 
reject the Client's request. Since only the Client 
has the secret key to create the authenticator, the 
successful decipherment of the ticket indicates to 
the trusted authority that the Client has behaved 
accordingly and no active attacks have occurred. 
Note that if conditions require more explicit ac-
knowledgment by the Client, the authenticator 
can be submitted together with the Clients name, 
address and ticket timestamp through a separate 
secure channel (eg. a separate instance of the cryp-
tosystem). 
An important point worth noting concerns the 
method of encipherment of the cryptosystem of [9] 
in contrast to the RSA cryptosystem [8]. In the 
cryptosystem of [9] all the principals (ie. Clients, 
KDC, TGSs and Servers) share the same param-
eters 9 and p. This leads to the easy forma-
tion of keys (Equation (1)), authenticators (Equa-
tion (2)), decryptors (Equation (3)) and selectors. 
From the practical point of view this compares 
favourably with the RSA cryptosystem in which 
every principal must accompany its public key 
with its individual modulus N. 
In the case of the RSA cryptosystem, the shar-
ing of the modulus N does not lead to the possi-
ble combination of keys belonging to two differ-
ent principals. More specifically, assume in RSA 
that P and Q are (secret) primes whose product 
is N, and that ¢(N) = lcm(P - 1,Q - 1). The 
secret and public keys (k,K) in RSA must sat-
isfy k K == 1 mod ¢(N). The encipherment of a 
plaintext M is done as Mk mod N, while the re-
sulting ciphertext can be deciphered by applying 
the public key K in the same exponentiation man-
ner. Here note that both P and Q are secret to 
the owner of the keys, and hence ¢(N) must also 
be secret. This means that the ¢(N) of one node 
cannot be shared with other nodes, and thus other 
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nodes cannot use it to create combination of keys 
in the manner of Equation (1). 
This apparent difficulty to combine keys in the 
RSA stems from the fact that exponentiation in 
RSA is applied to the message. In the cryptosys-
tern of [9] exponentiation is done on the generator 
g, independent of the message to be enciphered. 
8 Security achieved 
One of the primary motivating reasons for employ-
ing the cryptosystem of [9] is its strength against 
chosen ciphertext attacks [15]. In such an attack 
the attacker has access to the deciphering algo-
rithm and can feed the algorithm with any in-
put ciphertext in order to obtain its corresponding 
original plaintext. From these matching instances 
the attacker can then obtain information to finally 
cryptanalyze and break a given ciphertext. 
The cryptosystem is promising because it has 
been show in [9] to be secure, not only against cho-
sen ciphertext attacks, but further against adap-
tively chosen ciphertext attacks. In this type of 
attacks the attacker is permitted to select the in-
put ciphertext which are correlated to the target 
ciphertext. Hence, the attacker continues to have 
access to the enciphering algorithm even after the 
attacker has the target ciphertext. Clearly, the at-
tacker is not permitted to feed the target cipher-
text into the deciphering algorithm. 
In our mode of usage of the cryptosystem, 
the weakest point in the scheme is equivalent to 
solving instances of the discrete logarithm prob-
lem [16]. More specifically, in attempting to obtain 
any secret key that participated in the creation of 
an authenticator, a descriptor or a selector the at-
tacker is faced with solving a discrete logarithm 
problem. In attempting to obtain the plaintext 
ticket from any given ciphertext, the attacker must 
break the cryptosystem. 
9 Conclusion 
In this paper we have attempted to argue and illus-
trate that Kerberos-type authentication protocols 
have more to offer when they are founded upon 
public key cryptosystems. A protocol has been 
presented that implements the Kerberos authen-
tication service [3, 4, 5] using the recent public 
key cryptosystem of [9], which has been shown to 
be secure against the adaptatively chosen cipher-
text attacks. This protocol has also been extended 
to allow multiple services to be obtained by us-
ing the one same ticket. Another extension relat-
ing to hierarchical inter-realm authentication has 
been illustrated by way of two protocols based on 
the localized and globalized arrangement of keys. 
Public key cryptography provides the advantage 
of one-to-one secure and authentic communica-
tions between entities in the system, something 
which is not immediately available to approaches 
based on private key cryptography. Our selection 
of the cryptosystem of [9] is motivated not only 
by its high level of security, but also by the ease 
at which session key compositions can be created. 
The use of public key cryptography also has the 
advantage in that the trusted authorities can be 
implemented with less trust since they only main-
tain the publicly-known keys [10]. The protocols 
in the current work represents a step towards so-
lutions based on the mixture of private key and 
public key cryptography (such as in [17]), combin-
ing the advantages of both philosophies. 
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